Experts anticipate as many as 100 government and commercial lunar missions over the next decade. File shows an artist’s concept of the Artemis moon base. (Source: NASA)
ALEXANDRIA, Va. — It’s not every day that a top federal law enforcement agency turns its attention to outer space. But that’s what happened at the 2022 Value of Space Summit, hosted by the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) in Colorado Springs, Col.
During the multi-day proceedings, representatives from the FBI and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expressed interest in the developments in cislunar space. The discussions helped advance existing momentum for the Space ISAC to form a Cislunar Affinity Group (CLAG), which was formally launched in February. The group’s purpose is to provide a platform for cislunar stakeholders in government and industry to collaborate, discuss common challenges and exchange ideas related to the physical and cybersecurity of soon-to-be-deployed infrastructure on and around the moon.
But why would the FBI want to keep an eye on activities taking place 500,000 kilometers from Earth? According to Dr. Gabrielle Hedrick, an aerospace engineer at MITRE and a founder of the Space ISAC CLAG, the growing number of actors engaged in or planning lunar activities has caused agencies that might not have had a previous interest in space to take note. “This is no longer the Apollo Era,” she said. “We now have multiple actors. We are talking about sustained presence on the moon, and it is generating a whole different set of challenges, especially with adversary nations that might settle across the crater from us.”
The United States, Russia, China and India have all landed on the moon successfully, with the U.S. and China planning crewed missions in 2025 and 2030 respectively. Europe (ESA) and Japan have deployed lunar orbit missions and Japan is scheduled to land its Smart Lander for Investigating the Moon (SLIM) on the lunar surface in early 2024. A total of 29 nations have signed the Artemis Accords, signaling their intent to participate in the NASA-led program to establish a human presence on the moon for ongoing exploration and economic activity.
In addition to national space agencies, an estimated 80 commercial space companies are preparing to deploy systems that will service the lunar domain in the next decade. Excluding private investment in lunar activities, global governments spent approximately $11 billion this year on lunar exploration. According to Euroconsult, that figure is expected to reach $17 billion in 2032.
While the cislunar environment continues to be relatively benign, the pace of missions, technology systems, actors and sheer complexity of the environment add risk. Lina Cashin, a senior project engineer at the Aerospace Corporation and active CLAG participant, noted that while she could not identify a specific security threat to current lunar activities, the combination of factors demand attention. “I know that there is a potential for security concerns any time you have a race for either resources or leadership and influence.”
Identifying Threats
It’s not only federal law enforcement agencies taking an interest in the moon. Other agencies have turned their focus to the future of lunar exploration and the implications of commercial activity beyond GEO.
“It’s a whole of government problem,” Hedrick said. The Federal Communications Commission, which launched its Space Bureau earlier this year, could see its authority for licensing and regulating spectrum extended to the moon. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has allegedly considered extending space traffic management out to the cislunar orbits and there is speculation about how the Commerce Department’s new Office of Space Commerce will approach lunar development. Though the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 stipulates the peaceful use of celestial bodies, the U.S. Department of Defense has begun research activities around the moon and there are some arguments supporting a military defense of U.S. and allied interests beyond GEO.
Part of the FBI’s interest in cislunar activities centers on its role in identifying physical and cyberthreats to U.S. persons and assets, according to individuals with knowledge of the situation. The agency also plays a critical role in sharing that information with the public and private sector and international allies. Similarly, DHS has responsibility for investigating and responding to threats against critical infrastructure. While space assets are not considered critical infrastructure currently, some fall under existing sectors, such as the defense industrial base and critical manufacturing.
The threats to the human population in cislunar space will be limited for the foreseeable future by the small number of people operating there. However, given the increasing tempo of cyberthreats against space systems, there will be a need to monitor vulnerabilities within cislunar systems, networks and the supply chains enabling them.
“Data is the coin of the realm for cislunar,” said Ronald Birk, principal director of the Space Enterprise Evolution Directorate at the Aerospace Corporation. Accurate data transmission and data trust will be “foundational” to the operation of the robotic, autonomous systems that will form the basis of cislunar infrastructure in the near-term, he continued. “It becomes essential that data are trusted and assured. And that drives the need for security.”
Protecting Cislunar Infrastructure
Researchers at the Aerospace Corporation identified 12 foundational layers of infrastructure that will be part of the cislunar environment. This infrastructure encompasses logistics and transportation systems to and from the moon, communications, position, navigation and timing (PNT), domain awareness and remote sensing, power, data processing and security writ large.
In considering integrated master planning for the cislunar ecosystem, the Aerospace Corporation specified 12 foundational layers of infrastructure. (Source: The Aerospace Corporation)
Like any space infrastructure, these systems will be vulnerable to both adversarial and environmental threats. An adversary might intentionally jam critical communications or PNT systems. Commercial vendors and Earth-based systems could be targeted by malicious cyberthreat actors, all of which underscores the importance of designing security and resilience into systems.
“We want to tackle threats that can be mitigated early, such as cyber, by ‘baking-in’ solutions from the start,” said Hedrick. “But we also want to discuss physical security and supply chain vulnerabilities, both of which present unique difficulties given the challenges of accessing the Moon.”
Many of the physical security issues arise from the unfamiliar operating environment and lack of existing infrastructure. Space weather poses a threat and space weather prediction will be critical to protect crewed and robotic missions. Collision avoidance will require a sensor network for situational awareness beyond GEO. Additionally, the growing number of actors and assets raises the not-so-distant risk of overcrowding.
“Congestion is a threat. We don’t think about it in the current context because the moon’s surface and the domain is largely greenfield,” Birk advised. “But if we project forward and recognize that there are over 100 missions planned in the next decade, many of those focused on the South pole of the moon, congestion can become a challenge.”
The relatively small area of desirable real estate for landing missions is just one example of the risks of overcrowding. Radio frequency and electromagnetic interference are likely to arise as more systems are deployed. There is also ongoing discussion on how to dispose of cislunar debris. The moon lacks the benefits of an atmosphere to burn up space junk and Lagrange points provide a limited number of stable orbital slots.
Resources for Threat Coordination
It is in the interest of all space actors to maintain the moon as a peaceful operating environment. As cislunar space becomes more developed with different systems, national operators, companies and interests, there will be a growing need for the various players to coordinate their activities.
“It’s not like the wild west,” Cashin said, emphasizing the need to coordinate around issues like collision avoidance, reporting system failures and other incidents that could impact everyone within the ecosystem. “With more actors and missions in cislunar space, there are increasing considerations for shared standards.”
An appreciation for the value of coordination within such a unique operating environment assisted in the formation of a Cislunar Ecosystem Task Force within the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). It also informed the Space ISAC’s decision to form the CLAG, which also serves as the security working group for AIAA’s task force.
Having a clearinghouse for information sharing and analysis of space threats enables benefits to all parties involved. The combination of resources and capabilities helps individual companies, organizations and nations keep pace with threats and develop solutions to shared challenges more efficiently, while helping to foster norms of behavior.
Within the space community, there is a growing awareness that just because certain challenges have not materialized today, does not prevent their emergence in the future. “[T]hat is where we need to discuss how to maintain a peaceful lunar environment,” Hedrick noted. “That’s exactly why we need groups such as the Space ISAC, because more than ever we need to communicate, collaborate, and cooperate to continue safe and secure space operations, to the Moon and beyond.”
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